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I. INTRODUCTION: Two IMAGES
On a recent evening, The Deer Hunter,1 an old movie I had
never seen, came on the television after the show I had been
watching. Its first scene showed a group of all white male workers
leaving their factory jobs at the end of their shift sometime during
the Vietnam War. They were laughing and joking among them-
selves. Obviously, it was quitting time.
This scene evoked images of another opening scene, a scene
from Showboat,2 a movie I saw many years ago while still in high
school. On a plantation in the antebellum South, one of the slave
field hands yelled out at the end of the shift, "it's quittin' time."
Then, stereotypically, a very large, very dark black man ap-
proached him and said (in dialect presumably appropriate to the
time and place), "I'se de fomun; I'll say when it's quittin' time."
t Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago. For a decade prior to entering teach-
ing, the author was staff attorney, then First Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund. In the latter capacity, he was on the brief in Griggs v Duke Power Co.,
401 US 424 (1971), to which Professor Epstein has taken fulsome objection in the book
under review (pp 192-216).
1 The Deer Hunter (Universal, 1978).
2 Showboat (MGM, 1951). Based on the novel by Edna Ferber.
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He turned around immediately and yelled out to all the other
slaves, "It's quittin' time!" Predictably, the movie audience roared
with laughter.
I'm not quite sure what reminded me of the Showboat scene
as I watched The Deer Hunter. Both images struck me as having
something in common, yet being vastly different. Perhaps they
struck me much as the image of a Native American lamenting the
uselessness of the lighthouse in piercing the fog struck William
Prosser about the difficulty of teaching law.'
I suspect that when Richard Epstein wrote Forbidden
Grounds he thought little or not at all about what these haunting
powerful images imply for the legitimacy of the "antidiscrimina-
tion principle" (pp 1-2) today. In more than 500 pages, Epstein
mounts his "frontal intellectual assault" on "the social consensus
that supports one or another version of the modern antidiscrimina-
tion principle" (p 6). Indeed, he rejects the relevance of these
images; Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,4 for him the most
regrettable outcropping of the antidiscrimination principle, "fo-
cuses too heavily on historical injustices, for which there is no ade-
quate remedy, and too little on the economic and social conse-
quences that are generated by the antidiscrimination laws" (p 2).
As a result, Epstein would jettison the antidiscrimination principle
and return to so-called free market principles.
But the nation developed the antidiscrimination principle in
light of just what these two scenes show about workplace inequal-
ity. The principle, represented in the workplace by Title VII and
its companion statutes,5 has only recently begun to affect the es-
sence of the quitting-time scenes from Showboat and The Deer
Hunter. Title VII has been in place for only twenty-eight years. By
contrast, the African slavery depicted in the scene from Showboat
was in place as a formal matter for 236 years and systematic, le-
gally-sanctioned, race-based discrimination for 100 years thereafter
when Title VII went into effect. The white male presence in the
workplace depicted in The Deer Hunter has endured from the pe-
3William Prosser, Lighthouse No Good, 1 Journal of Legal Education 257 (1948):
Lighthouse, him no good for fog. Lighthouse, him whistle, him blow, him ring bell, him
flash light, him raise hell; but fog come in just the same.
In this Review, I will try to dispel some of the fog.
' Pub L 88-352, 78 Stat 241 (1964), codified at 42 USC § 2000e et seq (1988).
' Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub L 90-202, 81 Stat 602, 29 USC §§ 621-
34 (1967); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub L 101-336, 104 Stat 327, codified at
42 USC § 12111 et seq (1990).
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riod of colonization to the present, more than 375 years. Both
images originated in the free market system Epstein extols, and
nothing in the operation of the market up to the advent of Title
VII seemed capable of dispelling either the separate images or
their discriminatory effects.
Epstein wholeheartedly rejects the conclusion that seems to
follow from his own observations. To say, as he does, that
"[h]istory often leaves us with only second-best devices to combat
evils that are in principle better controlled by other means" (p 10)
seems to lead to the conclusion that "second-best" devices are nec-
essary so long as the "other means" (read, the market) fail to cor-
rect, indeed perpetuate, the evil. When the dominant princi-
ple-"[t]he self-ownership of individual labor [that] forms the
cornerstone for freedom of contract in labor markets" (p 24)-has
suffered such a massive dislocation as was the slave system, to ar-
gue for that principle as a self-evident present corrective of market
failure on so vast a scale, is at best naive and at worst, unprinci-
pled. History left the nation little choice. It leaves us little choice
today.
II. THE ABSENCE OF CHOICE
To understand our lack of choice is to track the very ground
that Epstein surveys in his book. The survey moves successively
from the analytical foundations of social contract theory and the
principle of free labor (ch 1); through considerations of how unreg-
ulated private markets function and are perfectible through free-
dom of contract (chs 2,3); through acceptable reasons for market
regulation, for example, monopoly, prevention of fraud, and force
(ch 4); through the history of market restrictions for racial reasons
prior to Title VII (chs 5, 6); through discussion of the various bases
for challenging the constitutionality of Title VII, indeed, the entire
1964 Civil Rights Act 6 (ch 7); through the virtues of the contract at
will as a counterpoise to the antidiscrimination principle of Title
VII (ch 8); and finally-and extensively-through analysis of con-
tract theory, statutory language, legislative history, and case law
that purportedly expose the market inutility of all the grounds of
discrimination-race, sex, age and disability-forbidden by Title
VII and its successor laws (chs 9-22). Taken together (and restated
often), it is hard to imagine a set of arguments that so clearly
' Pub L 88-352, 78 Stat 241 (1964), codified at 42 USC §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a-2000h-6
(1988).
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demonstrate why this nation's history left it with little choice other
than to enact the modern antidiscrimination laws.
A. Theory
Epstein's recapitulation of basic social contract theory
whereby government is established to prevent force, fraud and ag-
gression is, on its face, unexceptionable.7 The projection from such
basic theory to his economic theory that free markets function ide-
ally when force, fraud, and aggression are controlled also seems
perfectly rational. Central to his thesis is the Lockean view that
each person has a right to control his or her own labor and may
dispose of it in essentially private, voluntary transactions unfet-
tered by governmental regulations (pp 21-24). From this theoreti-
cal plane, Epstein condemns modern antidiscrimination laws-as
well as some others'-as destructive of the freedom that would
otherwise result. Individual liberty, i.e., autonomy, is lost.
The argument, though compelling in its simplicity, strikes at
precisely the wrong targets and comes much too late to be useful
for present American society.9 Its crystalline simplicity, like all
such arguments drawn from theory alone, proves far too little in
light of the array of practices that subverted its usefulness. The
argument should have been addressed to the creation of the insti-
tution of African slavery which departed from the very constructs
of the theory. Slavery was the antithesis of what that theory would
have required. Together, theory and practice accounted for the
plantation image alluded to at the outset of this piece and ulti-
mately required the correctives that free market theory did
not-and under the circumstances could not-achieve.
One circumstance, on the theoretical level, was the use of
white-supremacist theory to justify slavery as an institution.10
"[W]ithout theory, there can be no normative limits on unbridled self-interest, no
conception of antisocial behavior, and no protection of individual rights" (p 15).
" Epstein generally disfavors collective bargaining and minimum wage legislation en-
acted during the New Deal period and earlier, such as the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 45
USC §§ 151-163 (1982) (pp 118-26).
' "The queen, my lord is dead."
"She should have died hereafter;
"There would have been time for such a word."
- Macbeth Act V, Scene V
See also Edward Arlington Robinson, Miniver Cheevy.
"0 In this regard, a particularly interesting theorist of the antebellum South was a
writer named George Fitzhugh, who published his arguments in two major works-Sociology
For the South or the Failure of Free Society (Morris, 1854); Cannibals All! or Slaves With-
out Masters (Morris, 1857)-and in a number of articles published in De Bow's Review, a
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With such an elaborately constructed justification, the very ideas
of ownership of one's labor, of property in one's person, of right in
the work of one's hands (p 21) were meaningless for millions of
men and women of African origin and descent. The principle of
coercion (id) and the inevitable subjugation that must accompany
so severe a departure from articulated norms replaced a principle
of consent. The principle of self-interest, prominent as a basis for
the ideal operation of free markets,11 simply could not work where
the market was not free for the labor component-the slave. The
master's self-interest, which created the system and perpetuated it
until destroyed by the ultimate use of force-war, was the sole in-
terest at work. The vision of the benefits of free market enterprise
was enveloped in the fog of the system that rolled in for over two
centuries despite the lighthouse the theory presupposed." In this
absence of consent, a different paradigm prevailed: work without
pay, power, and prestige-the customary expectations and benefits
of the workplace.
A market thus created by asymmetrical freedom differed
markedly from the contract at will described by Epstein (ch 8).
The voluntary labor market does allow, at least in theory, "under-
standings about whether the employment relation shall continue or
terminate" (p 147). However, continuance of the relation in the
slave system was at the sufferance of the employer; his will alone
could be enforced by law.'3 Freedom of contract did not differ from
New Orleans periodical, between 1858 and 1860. The essence of Fitzhugh's arguments was
that a generally operative "slavery principle" had always existed in human affairs, was a
natural and normal condition, and that government itself is slavery and the rule of law the
will of the superior. The Negro's enslavement was particularly justified by his innate inferi-
ority and notions of free society were a hoax. Fitzhugh thought Negroes unfit to compete
with other groups and therefore, better off as slaves than as free laborers.
" Most of the principle is set out in chapter 2. His discussion of the urn example in-
cludes this observation: "If white workers on average have higher levels of productivity (say,
because they have had a better education), then the employer is better off engaging in sta-
tistical discrimination because there is no way in which further investigation would allow it
to identify superior black workers" (p 33) (emphasis added). The comment appears to have
some relevance to the Griggs decision. See discussion below accompanying notes 54-67.
" See note 3.
13 Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution contained a fugitive slave clause: "No person held
to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in
consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but
shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."
Under authority of the clause, Congress passed the first of two fugitive slave laws in 1793
providing means for recovery of fugitive slaves and penalizing those aiding escape. Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793, 1 Stat 302, repealed at 13 Stat 280 (1864). In Prigg v Pennsylvania, 41
US (6 Pet) 539 (1842), the Supreme Court upheld the statute and reversed the conviction,
under a Pennsylvania law, of a slave owner's agent who recaptured a fleeing slave.
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freedom of speech or action (p 149); these too, were privileges of
whites alone. The supposed functional advantages of self-interest
and risk aversion (p 152) were repressed, though on occasion,
slaves asserted them through escape attempts or even more dra-
matically, through slave revolts.14 "Reputational constraints" (p
154) in the case of the employer-master were certainly not rele-
vant; indeed, his reputation was most jeopardized by any unseemly
departure from this version of the free market system. Negotiation
over terms was nonexistent.
To be sure, laws would come eventually, but when they came,
it was to reflect the market, to shore it up, to reinforce it. 15 The
market had already taken root in the way markets are normally
created-on the basis of the self-interested strivings of men for
gain and their desire to consolidate those gains. Epstein mistak-
enly blames the network of Jim Crow laws (ch 5) for the system
that prevailed because they reflected these strivings and the ac-
companying passion for power. However, in all periods, at every
season, the laws that men adopt reflect the nature of their inter-
ests, their passions, their power and their morality. What they
choose to enact into law says much about who and what they are.
Their choices make public their private souls. To argue that, but
for the coercion of laws, other values would have been predomi-
nant, belies the historical record. The "free market" of the slavery
period in American life was not an accidental occurrence nor an
occurrence unaccompanied by a wide consensus in all relevant sec-
tors of private enterprise. To the extent that this system of private
enterprise perverted the "pure" economic theories related to the
basic social contract vision, the appropriate point of attack should
be on that system rather than subsequently enacted (corrective)
civil rights laws.
Subsequently, in Strader v Graham, 51 US (10 How) 82 (1850), written by Chief Justice
Taney who seven years later would write the opinion of the Court in the Dred Scott Case,
the Court dismissed an appeal from a Kentucky court judgment awarding damages to a
defendant who had aided the escape of the plaintiff's slaves. Finally, in Ableman v Booth,
62 US (21 How) 506 (1859), the Court upheld the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.
14 The slave revolts led by Denmark Vesey and Nat Turner are the most famous. Wil-
liam Styron's book, Confessions of Nat Turner (Random House, 1966) is a fictionalized,
psychological account of Turner's 1831 revolt in Virginia.
1 Typical are the colonial enactments of Maryland in 1664 and New Jersey in 1704.
See Albert P. Blaustein and Robert L. Zangrando, eds, Civil Rights and the American Ne-
gro: A Documentary History 7-31 (Tribune, 1968) where these and other statutes are col-
lected. For extensive treatment of these laws in the colonial period, see A. Leon Higginbot-
ham, Jr., In the Matter of Color (Oxford, 1978) and for the early national period up to the
start of the Civil War, see Mark V. Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery: 1810-1860
(Princeton, 1981).
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Nor will a hopeless, misguided, almost romantic yearning for
common law rules serve as a substitute for what in fact emerged
from the real market that was the slave system. If "the antidis-
crimination laws should be understood as an assault on the com-
pleteness of [the] common law rules [of contract] and the intellec-
tual foundations on which they rest," (p 27) what then can be said
of the slave system? If, as declared, "the set of rights .. developed
at common law... exhaust the universe of rules on original enti-
tlements" (pp 26-27), then the slave system's violation of those
contracting rules deserves perpetual condemnation. Those rules
prevented slaves from making any contract and reduced "original
entitlement" to that which was wrested by sheer, naked
power-the power of force rather than the power of bargain. Ab-
sent a true bargain, the rules had no space in which to operate and
could make no claim for legitimacy. Questions of enforcement
could never arise in a situation where the courts were closed com-
pletely to one of the "contracting" parties.
Beyond this, it is fundamental error-fundamental intellec-
tual error-to assume such "completeness" of the common law
rules. Their dominant characteristic across the full spectrum of not
only contract, but of tort, property, and procedure as well, was
their changeable character and adaptability to evolving circum-
stances. One need only trace the development of new forms of ac-
tion to accommodate the need for new rights and remedies, the rise
of a system of equity and the eventual need for legislation to
change the common law rules. Moreover, the society in which the
common law rules emerged was rife with its own inequalities of
class, of status based on a kingship system resulting from birth,
rather than from earned entitlements. As a model for "original en-
titlement," the kingship system encountered widespread rejection
as it adapted and molded to the needs of emerging colonies and
later, new states. One notable exception, however, was the system
of entitlements reserved for white male settlers who would occupy
the New World, and soon thereafter create, under the guise of free
market principles theoretically based on the common law system,
the most far reaching rejection of those principles in the history of
the human race. Epstein's declaration that "[t]he older common
law rule is as functional today as it ever was" (p 158) misappre-
hends not only the common law system, but the manner in which
it functioned in the private sphere in this country without any leg-
islative component. When one adds the legislative and judicial
components, the history that formed the backdrop of modern an-
1993]
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tidiscrimination laws is pellucid. Its lessons, obviously, are another
matter.
B. History
History is the stuff of stubborn fact, of a moving finger that
"having writ, Moves on."1 6 We now need "second-best" (p 10) solu-
tions to problems that might have been solved differently because
the tale of what actually happened, rather than of what might have
happened, makes a theoretically "best" solution no longer possible.
The absolute failure of free market solutions to provide any sem-
blance of workplace autonomy to slaves in the antebellum South
(though, to be sure, there was "full" employment) was such a prob-
lem. It was compounded after formal emancipation and Civil War,
by the lack of training and education needed for an increasingly
industrialized economy. As to the training previously received in a
largely agrarian economy-the most rudimentary skills associated
with plantation tilling (one of the images referred to at the begin-
ning)-no market existed for the skills learned because white men
"refused to deal" except, immediately after the Civil War, on the
terms of the Black Codes. 17 Shut out of the markets available to
white men, one might posit the possibility of newly freed slaves
creating alternate markets of their own where they could use
whatever skills they had acquired in an agricultural economy. But,
alas, the promise of "forty acres and a mule" of the Freedmen's
Bureau that had been established in 1865' 5-the first "affirmative
action" initiative-had failed. The immediate post-bellum situa-
tion underscored the continuing problem of free market failure for
those of African descent, who could neither form a labor contract
nor acquire land, even after the formal documents of freedom had
been entered on the nation's legal rolls.
Congress's "first cut" 19 at the problem was the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.20 Echoing the views of the dissenters in Jones v Mayer
Co.,21 Epstein declares that "[t]he evil to which the statute was
'6 Edward FitzGerald, The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam St 51 (Quaritch, 1859). The
Persian poet further informs us that, "not all your Piety nor Wit Shall lure it back to cancel
half a Line, Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it." Id.
17 For a representative code, see the South Carolina Code reproduced in Blaustein and
Zangrando, Civil Rights and the American Negro at 217-25 (cited in note 15).
18 The Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands was established by the
Freedmen's Bureau Act, 13 Stat 507 (1865).
19 Epstein is fond of using this phrase (pp 413, 426).
20 42 USC §§ 1981, 1982 (1988).
21 392 US 409, 453 (1968) (Harlan dissenting).
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directed was a wrong committed by the state, its systematic denial
of ordinary civil capacity. Its target was not private discrimina-
tion" (pp 134-35). Of course, the majority in Jones and in Runyon
v McCrary22 decided eight years later, in holding that the Act did
afford remedies against purely private discrimination, disagreed for
a very simple straightforward reason. Neither the slave codes, nor
state laws in effect during slavery, had in terms disqualified slaves
from making contracts; they didn't need to because the common
thread of these provisions was that slaves were property. As such,
they had no rights; treatment as property confirmed their total le-
gal disability. The denial of the "right to contract" therefore, was
immanent in the structure of the laws defining the status, an obvi-
ous and necessary corollary. As "an axiom in morals as well as in
politics,... men in every grade and position in society daily and
habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits .... I2s
Their private pursuits were not the result of state coercion.
White men to be sure, might refuse to contract with other white
men for a host of reasons, but not because of race. Therefore, the
Act's declaration that former slaves had "the same right . ..to
make contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ' 24 clearly meant
the only thing it could mean: neither they25 nor any white man
could refuse to deal because of race. A refusal to deal might be
supportable on other grounds: simple dislike, the terms of the pro-
posed bargain, the time of day, the phases of the moon, or even the
truly intimate nature of the contract." But one could not refuse to
'2 427 US 160 (1976).
23 Dred Scott, 60 US (19 How) at 407.
24 14 Stat 27, § 1 (1866).
"6 "The Court holds in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co. [427 US 273 (1976)],
that § 1981 gives to whites the same cause of action it gives to blacks. Thus under the
majority's construction of § 1981 . . . a former slave owner was given a cause of action
against his former slave if the former slave refused to work for him on the ground that he
was a white man. It is inconceivable that Congress ever intended such a result." Runyon,
427 US at 211 (White dissenting).
Why it is "inconceivable" Justice White does not say. In both situations, the key is
proof of the racially motivated refusal rather than refusal on some other ground. It appears
from the Court's subsequent cases that the Court, as well as the statute, "means what it
says" because cases subsequent to Runyon and McDonald have extended the reach of the
statute's race-based focus. See Jones, 392 US at 421. See also, Saint Francis College v Al-
Khazraji, 481 US 604 (1987) (Arabs have claim under § 1981); Shaare Tefila Congregation
v Cobb, 481 US 615 (1987) (Jews have claim under § 1982). Without proof that a racial
reason is involved, the cause of action will fail no matter who the plaintiff is. Justice White's
former slave could lie about the reason just as well as whites have lied to blacks over the
years; both ought to have the "same right."
26 See, for example, Justice Powell's private tutor, babysitter, or housekeeper examples
in his Runyon concurrence, 427 US at 187 (Powell concurring), and the private club exemp-
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deal solely on the basis of the other party's "race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." Allowing these as reasons would nullify the
1866 Act, which sought to eradicate the "badges and incidents" of
slavery.27 So, when Epstein says that Justice Stewart was "correct
that the statutory language is 'plain and unambiguous,'" (p 134) I
agree. But I do not agree that the Court gave a "blatantly [ ]
wrong interpretation by treating it as a general antidiscrimination
law . . ." (id). It clearly is; Congress would have accomplished too
little to justify the effort if it wasn't that. As such, "the statute is
actually consistent with a uniform regime of free choice for all per-
sons" (id)-a free choice that excludes, for obvious reasons, race as
a ground for discrimination. Since it was not a ground for discrimi-
nation in the free market for whites, to permit it as a ground for
either whites or blacks to use in the employment market would not
make the right to contract the same right.
Not until Title VII was passed, however, did the 1866 Act
have any real significance. As an attempt to reverse two centuries
of custom, practice and law by legislative command, the 1866 Act
faltered before its revival by the Jones decision. Again, history ex-
plains both its failure and why Congress was compelled to take its
"second-cut" in 1964. The history was social and political, that is,
the absence of will in the total society, in all its institu-
tions-North and South-to promote the real freedom of choice
Epstein argues for. But, legal history played a part as well.28 Most
scholars agree that the ultimate political event signalling that fail-
tion under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000a(e) (1988). See also,
Moose Lodge v Irvis, 407 US 163 (1972) (enjoining enforcement of facially neutral liquor law
when it requires compliance with private club's racially discriminatory rules). These are not
the kind of associations contemplated under Title VII, which clearly applies to non-intimate
commercial employment contracts.
27 "Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to de-
termine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that
determination into effective legislation." Jones, 392 US at 440.
Congress's power is certainly no less when legislating under the Commerce Clause-see
Heart of Atlanta Motel v United States, 379 US 241 (1964); Katzenbach v McClung, 379
US 294 (1964)-or under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment-see Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427
US 445 (1976)-the bases for Title VII.
28 Soon after the 1866 Act was passed, the judicial process that would blunt its effec-
tiveness began. See Blyew v United States, 80 US (13 Wall) 581 (1871) (allowing Kentucky
law to bar black witnesses to a crime to which they were not parties). See also Bowlin v
Commonwealth, 65 Ky 5 (1867) (Congress cannot preempt state's power to regulate Ken-
tucky laws on black witnesses). The process reached its nadir in Hodges v United States,
203 US 1 (1906), subsequently overruled in Jones, 392 US at 441-43 n 78. For a full descrip-
tion of the process with respect not only to the 1866 Act but all the other congressional civil
rights legislation as well, see Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Leg-
islation, 50 Mich L Rev 1323 (1952).
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ure was the 1877 compromise that ended Reconstruction. 9 The ul-
timate judicial event, however, was the Supreme Court's decision
in the Civil Rights Cases0 which placed a stamp of approval on
the earlier political compromise.3 1 Probably more than any other
decision of the period, it thwarted any real possibility of national
government action affecting the conduct of private entrepreneurs
who blocked access to the free market by blacks. In holding the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional as beyond Congress's
power under either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court rejected the idea of citizenship first written in the 1866 Act
and later, into the Fourteenth Amendment. This idea was essential
to any prospect of African-American advancement in the world of
integrated, private markets by slave descendants.
Epstein agrees that this statute, Congress's "first cut" at a
public accommodations statute," was "an antidiscrimination stat-
ute" (p 134). He also agrees with the Court majority's requirement
of state action to support any remedy against private discrimina-
tion (p 135). Justice Harlan's powerful dissent aside, 3 the rejection
of the wrongfulness of private discrimination-solely on the basis
of race-determined for nearly a century white vendors' limited le-
gal obligation to deal with blacks, even when exchanges with
blacks supported their own economic interests. The absence of any
obligation distorted the market. Consequently, Congress, as part of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, enacted Title II-the public accommo-
dations title-to change this situation and the Supreme Court, in
upholding Title II, recognized the need to cure such distortion.34
Epstein's argument that the lack of integrated exchanges re-
sulted from segregationist policies of government in the country at
large, and from an array of other governmental barriers to free
trade (pp 126-29), simply won't wash.3 5 History does not confirm
29 See for example, Kenneth M. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction 210 (Vintage,
1965); John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans 264-
67 (Knopf, 1947); C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and
the End of Reconstruction 4 (Little, Brown, 1951).
20 109 US 3 (1883).
31 See John Anthony Scott, Justice Bradley's Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth
Amendment From the Slaughterhouse Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 Rutgers L Rev
552, 568-69 (1971), and Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21
Rutgers L Rev 387, 396-97 (1967).
3 Congress's "second cut" was Title 11 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 USC § 2000a et
seq (1988).
109 US at 25 (Harlan dissenting).
See note 27.
31 The Civil Rights Cases involved discrimination by proprietors of an inn, a hotel,
theatres, and a railroad. 109 US at 4-5. The discrimination was not coerced by segregation
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this. Laws regulating labor relations, and to a great extent, land
use, were yet to come. Health and safety regulations may have
been "commonplace in 1875" (p 132), but they did not cause the
discrimination against the plaintiffs in the Civil Rights Cases. The
full panoply of state segregation laws was not yet in
place-Reconstruction was still afoot-and would not become the
norm until Plessy v Ferguson"8  endorsed the laws'
constitutionality.3 7
Epstein's condemnation of Plessy as a principal protector of
"the massive state legislative regulation of private markets that
was left unchecked by passive judicial action" (p 94) is surely mis-
placed. Plessy can-and has-been condemned for many things,
but it cannot bear all the baggage of the argument made that only
"[g]overnment coercion required the separation of the races," (p
100) and that but for these silly, pesky laws (pp 101-03) the rail-
roads' economic self-interest would have prompted them to throw
their arms open to blacks on a non-segregated basis. No, it is much
more probable that the proprietors in the Civil Rights Cases and
the railroads in Plessy were following their own inclinations as well
as community custom. 38 Evasion of responsibility for private choice
is not possible. Whatever the costs of exclusion by the proprietors,
or separation by the railroads, they were costs both were willing to
bear. No amount of "ingenious verbal criticism"3 9 can blunt the
plain fact that these decisions endorsed private market exclusions
because of race.
Finally, in the employment context, the Court in Hodges v
United States40 refused jurisdiction of an indictment of white men
for the use of private force to prevent blacks from performing a
laws. Had they been, the "state action" principle announced in the case would have required
a different result, as the court acknowledged. Id at 11.
36 163 US 537 (1896).
37 See the, by now, classic study by historian C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career
of Jim Crow (Oxford, 1966). In tracing "Jim Crow's" strange career, Woodward examines
the variations in the pattern of the emergence of segregation laws which show that it was
not until the early twentieth century that they were uniformly adopted in all the Southern
states. For example, he writes:
More than a decade was to pass after Redemption [The Compromise of 1877] before
the first Jim Crow law was to appear upon the law books of a Southern state, and more
than two decades before the older states of the seaboard were to adopt such laws.
Id at 34.
Id ("There was much segregation and discrimination of an extra-legal sort before the
laws were adopted in all the states. "). See also id at ix ("Segregation often anticipated
and frequently exceeded the law.").
39 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 US at 26 (Harlan dissenting).
40 203 US 1 (1906).
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labor contract to work at a sawmill. Now if, as urged by Epstein,
force is one of the chief destructive elements of a free market
which government is entitled to prevent, what historical lesson do
we draw in light of a decision by the nation's highest court to con-
demn national legislation enacted to guarantee free market access
to former slaves and their descendants? What further lesson does
widespread -acceptance of this decision-as well as the earlier
ones-teach?
Surely, one lesson must be that the continued market failure
as it affected Africans who were now, at least nominally, also
Americans, was rooted in their former slave status. Since that sta-
tus and its disabilities were based on race, how could continued
exclusion from employment opportunities not be because of race?
The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act4 1 after the nation began
to come apart at the seams seemed to signify that we had learned
some part of history's lesson.
C. Law
1. Return to "quittin' time."
I now return to the other image-the scene from The Deer
Hunter. What does it represent and what can we properly infer?
Both it and the Showboat scene depict a group of men at "quittin'
time," but The Deer Hunter scene shows a group of white
men-no blacks, no women. The men in this scene, unlike those in
the other, are at their workplace as a result of some form of bar-
gain exercised at least nominally through their own free
choice-the Epstein model. They are not forced labor as were their
counterparts in the contrasting scene. They are benefitting from a
legally mandated minimum wage.," Since the scene takes place
sometime during the Vietnam War, that minimum wage had been
increasing since the Supreme Court first upheld its enabling legis-
lation, a regulation of the market to which Epstein also objects (pp
125-26). Through extension to other groups of employees,48 these
41 42 USC § 2000a-b.
42 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 USC §§ 201-219 enacted minimum wage
and maximum hours requirements. Its constitutionality was upheld in United States v
Darby, 312 US 100 (1941).
"' Coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act was extended by two amendments in the
1960s. In Maryland v Wirtz, 392 US 183 (1968), the Court upheld the first extension in 1961
to all employees in private industry and a subsequent extension in 1966 to employees of
state-operated schools and hospitals. National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833 (1976),
initially struck down a later extension to all employees of state and local governments, but
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minimum wages became the expectations of workers throughout
the country. To be sure, any blacks or women employed at the
same plant, were receiving at least the minimum wage, but these
white men probably were paid more than blacks or women due to
differences in job classification and seniority.
Assuming a unionized plant, their job classifications and se-
niority most likely resulted from a collective bargaining agreement
negotiated by their union with their employer. Like the minimum
wage, the collective bargaining agreement, with its accompanying
job protection, resulted from market regulation legislation enacted
and upheld during the New Deal period." Epstein also finds this
fact of American life regrettable (p 119) though it too had become
a staple of the workplace when Title VII was passed. Because for
many years into this century, blacks were shut out of most jobs in
the private market, except those in the lowest paying, menial cate-
gories, the likelihood is that the men in this scene, irrespective of
their educational attainment or other "qualifications," had far bet-
ter jobs than the blacks employed at their factory (assuming some
were). Their longer period of access assured this. In turn, this
greater access assured their higher seniority when blacks were
hired.
Similarly, whatever number of women (again, assuming there
were some) worked at this place, it is fairly certain their hire was
of recent vintage.45 These men, therefore, had the same competi-
tive advantages over the women as they did over blacks.
Then too, these white men could advance further not only at
their present workplace, but in other venues as well. The movie's
early scenes capture this group as the men were about to go off to
war. When they returned, they were eligible (as were black veter-
ans) for the benefits legislated for them in appreciation of their
service. 46 This corresponded with the earlier experiences of
predominantly white male veterans who, during World War II,
were the commissioned officers who commanded the all-black units
the Court eventually overruled Usery in Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority, 469 US 528, 531 (1985).
44 See National Labor Relations Board v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US 1
(1937).
" The statute went into effect on July 2, 1965, one year after its passage. Recall that
The Deer Hunter scene took place during the Vietnam War, a few years later.
46 Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act, Pub L No 92-540, 86 Stat 1074 (1972),
codified in part at 38 USC § 2011 et seq (1988).
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in a racially segregated military.47 Beyond the greater entitlement
to these benefits, the difference in rank and grade not only made a
difference in the level of governmental benefits, but also provided
white men a competitive advantage as a class in the private mar-
ket. This competitive advantage affected women as well as
blacks.48 To be sure, these advantages resulted from governmental
largesse rather than decisions made in the private marketplace;
but they were absorbed in the marketplace and affected issues of
job advancement. As a form of affirmative action, the veteran's ad-
vantages were designed to be compensatory, to restore these men
to whatever approximate level they would have achieved but for
the disadvantages incurred by their service.
The men depicted in The Deer Hunter scene may well have
been hired initially through a union hiring hall closed to blacks, 9
certainly to women. Upon their return from the war, if they de-
cided to seek jobs elsewhere, they might use their governmental
educational benefits to earn advanced degrees that might qualify
them, in a formal sense, for placement in the upper echelons of
corporate management or even the academic arena. No discernible
barriers would block their entry5" and their upward movement
would only depend on the myriad of forces-some fortuitous, some
not, that account for mobility in any particular setting. But
whatever the setting, the higher they advanced, it would be un-
likely that they would find themselves in competition with many
blacks or women whose presence would be rare at these levels of
business and academe in the early years after Title VII took effect.
Then, as now, the Act has had little effect on these kinds of jobs. 1
47 President Truman's Executive Order No 9981, 3 CFR 722 (1948), created the Com-
mittee On Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services whose report be-
came the basis for eventual desegregation of the military.
48 See Personnel Administrator of Mass. v Feeney, 442 US 256 (1979). See also Fron-
tiero v Richardson, 411 US 677 (1973) (holding women a "suspect class" for equal protec-
tion application).
4' See General Building Contractors Assoc., Inc. v Pennsylvania, 458 US 375 (1982).
50 Prosser's lecture, given in 1948, referred only to the possibility of men qualifying as
law teachers (or as dean) and indeed-only to "boys" as law students. See Prosser, 1 J Legal
Educ at 262 (cited in note 3). With rare exceptions, such as William Robert Ming at the
University of Chicago, at this time all the men teaching in American law schools, outside of
the traditionally black schools, were white. More recently, the current president of the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools, Curt Berger, reminded law schools of the still small num-
ber of blacks, other minorities, and women on law school faculties in his address at the
January 1993 Annual Meeting reprinted in the February 1993 AALS Newsletter.
" See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 Harv L
Rev 945, 948 (1982).
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Clearly, the opportunities for initial entry, for job retention
and for subsequent advancement were far greater for these men,
not only as individuals, but for the class of which they were a part.
Every advantage of status and position had accrued to them over
centuries. They inherited the untrammeled opportunities of their
forbears. If of immigrant stock, they had achieved in a short time
what blacks had been denied for all time. They may have pos-
sessed natural ability, training, or educational attainment; never-
theless, much of that accrual was a consequence of race and sex
rather than talent and ambition. For them, the free market had
worked very well and likely would continue to do so. It was be-
cause it had failed for others that Congress took a "second cut" at
the problem of race-based (and now, sex-based) exclusion in 1964.
2. Griggs.
Against this backdrop, Title VII must be viewed as Congress's
long overdue effort to correct the market by allowing a huge seg-
ment of workers, historically excluded from the market, to com-
pete in a meaningful way. Epstein seems to agree that the Act's
proponents articulated this purpose (pp 160-63). He also appears
at some undeterminable level to appreciate the historical nature of
the problem faced in trying to make the necessary correction, and
accepts-albeit grudgingly-that purpose.2  But because as he
states, "[s]uccessful regulation of one part of the employment rela-
tionship requires regulation of all relevant particulars," (id) the
Act "is yet another instance of the pervasive problem of the so-
called regulatory pyramid" (pp 162-63). As such, its application to
all aspects of the employment relationship should have signaled
that its operation was more intrusive than its supporters had be-
lieved or insisted (p 163). The most intrusive feature of the statute,
he concludes, is its substitution of the prohibited grounds of race
and sex for a "true" conception of merit derived from the consent
achieved in the marketplace between employer and employee (pp
163-65). Once this substitution is made, he argues, the problem
arises of deciding whether an employment decision was made on
one of these grounds. Though the disparate treatment cases5 3 with
52 "It was quite possible to have our cake and eat it too, to admit a new form of regula-
tion and expand the overall level of social output and production" (p 162).
M See for example, McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792 (1973); Furnco Con-
struction Corp v Waters, 438 US 567 (1978); Texas Department of Community Affairs v
Burdine, 450 US 248 (1981); NLRB v Transporation Management Corp., 462 US 393
(1983). The plaintiffs' proof burden thought to have been settled in these cases, has now
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their relentless search for motive and pretext are bad enough, more
costly to operate than the common law rules (p 181), the real devil
at work, according to him, is the disparate impact approach en-
dorsed in Griggs v Duke Power Co.54
Two of Epstein's chapters (chs 10, 11) principally concern crit-
icism of Griggs. He scorns the case as a "fatally misguided ...
exercise of statutory construction" (p 184). He tells us that "the
Court seriously misunderstood the text, structure, and purpose of
the 1964 act" (id), that the "disparate impact cases are a creature
of judicial innovation" and that Griggs perverted both the lan-
guage and the legislative history of the act" (p 197). Griggs has
found its defenders elsewhere,5 5 and the successful assault on its
principles in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v Atonio56 has for now,
at least, been turned back by enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991.57 Congress's reaffirmation of Griggs reflects its understanding
that Griggs did not respond to economic theory but to historical
and current reality.
Griggs also responded completely to the two pictures I noted
at the outset. Epstein describes the facts of Griggs:
The Duke Power Company divided its power plant employees
into five divisions: labor, coal handling, operations, mainte-
nance, and laboratory and testing. Before the passage of the
Civil Rights Act the plant was rigidly segregated by race, with
black workers being allowed to apply only for jobs in the low-
est classification, the labor department, but not in the other
four operations departments. In 1955 the company instituted
a policy of requiring a high school diploma for workers who
were to take positions in any operations department, or who,
having started in coal handling, wanted internal transfers to
higher departments . . . . The passage of the 1964 Civil
apparently been altered by the Supreme Court's latest decision, St. Mary's Honor Center v
Hicks, 113 S Ct 2742 (1993).
401 US 424 (1971).
See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v Duke Power Co. and The
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 Mich L Rev 59 (1972); Alfred W. Blumrosen,
The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 Chi Kent L Rev 1
(1987) ("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has emerged as a major instrument of
social progress because of the Supreme Court decision in Griggs v Duke Power"); Robert
Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment Discrimination Law Re-
visited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 Tulane L Rev 1359, 1364 (1990)
("the Griggs doctrine has been an effective and powerful tool in remedying discrimination in
our society").
6 490 US 642 (1989).
"' Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (1991).
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Rights Act led Duke Power to dismantle its old system of ra-
cial classification (pp 192-93).
In other words, before 1965, Duke Power treated its black workers
like plantation field hands. White workers, like the men in The
Deer Hunter, held better jobs inside the plant.
Epstein dismisses the 1955 high school diploma requirement
as "obviously not [ ] a ploy to bar promotions for blacks, [who]
were already explicitly barred on racial grounds" (p 192). But the
requirement looked suspiciously like southern school districts' pu-
pil placement laws,58 adopted in anticipation of mandatory deseg-
regation after the second Brown decision. 9 Like the school boards,
Duke Power might well have understood that after desegregation it
would have to justify continued exclusion of blacks; imposing this
requirement would do the job. Some whites, but no blacks, trans-
ferred out of the labor department before adoption of the test.
Their "satisfactory work" (p 193) indicates that the test results
probably mattered little for job qualifications.
Griggs therefore, unveiled the reality of requirements unre-
lated to job performance-that blacks, to use the language of the
1866 statute, didn't have the "same right" as whites. When the
principal distinguishing variable is not the job involved, but rather
the race (or sex) of the worker, the exclusion obviously is, in Title
VII's terms, because of race (or sex). Just as black individuals
could not obtain jobs in the past simply because of their class
membership, irrespective of personal traits, so here, Title VII
deemed class membership relevant for a different purpose when
the class was affected as a whole. Personal traits ignored before
were also to be ignored now. People disqualified as a class before
would qualify as a class now. Simple corrective principle. And the
employer will have to show the relevance of employment criteria.
Also simple. The employer's business necessity defense guards
against a requirement to hire or advance people who can't perform
adequately. However, placing the burden of proof for establishing
it on the employer, not only shifts "the advantage of time and in-
ertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims,"6 but also
assures that the impact of the job requirement is a legitimate
58 See Shuttlesworth v Birmingham Board of Education, 162 F Supp 372 (ND Ala
1958). For a description of these laws and their effect see, Norman C. Amaker, De Facto
Leadership and the Civil Rights Movement: Perspective on the Problems and Role of Ac-
tivists and Lawyers In Legal and Social Change, 6 S U L Rev 225, 239 n 41 (1980).
59 Brown v Board of Education, 349 US 294 (1955).
60 South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 328 (1966).
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"cost" that must be borne now by those so often rejected before
simply because of their race (or sex). In its fullest sense then, the
Griggs rendering of the meaning of "because of race" takes account
of the images I began with and what they meant over time.
Epstein argues that "because of" means that the only basis for
a finding of discrimination should be the employer's motivation, in
other words, a state of mind requirement (p 184). Consequently,
"[t]he effect of a decision is in itself no reason to impose liability
under the statute" (id). But his argument fails even when judged
by the common law regime of which he is so fond. The common
law not only made as he states, "the unintended consequences of
intentional wrongs (disparate treatment) ... actionable," (p 185)
but also distinguished between intentional torts and negligence
(disparate impact). The latter distinction requires some fair way to
distribute the cost of unintentional conduct. Initial inquiry, how-
ever, delved into causation to determine liability not merely relief.
Once causation was shown and injury determined, relief followed.
It therefore does not strain the meaning of "because of" to equate
it to "but for" in the common law negligence test of cause-in-fact 6'
to decide which party should bear the cost. With "but for" shown,
that's the injured party, unless the court decides for policy reasons
that the cause-in-fact should not be treated as the proximate or
legal cause. In Title VII disparate impact cases, the injured party
is the member of the rejected (not the protected) class or indeed,
the class itself, when one can show indiscriminate causation as to
all its members. Once one determines the employment practice (or
practices) to be the proximate cause of the injury, liability is estab-
lished and relief follows as in the tort cases. And again, by rough
analogy, one can equate the business necessity defense to the tort
doctrine of necessity in intentional torts or "last clear chance" in
negligent torts as a means of minimizing the employer's burden
and redistributing the costs where intent is not the touchstone of
liability.2 Thus, viewed either from the standpoint of the reality of
61 For discussion of this element of causation, see Richard Epstein, Cases and Materi-
als on Torts 363-64 (Little, Brown, 5th ed 1990). ("This issue of proximate cause only arises
after it is first established that some harmful consequence suffered by the plaintiff was
caused in fact by the defendant, at least in the looser sense of 'but for' causation.... Often
the chain of events and actions that links the plaintiff's injury to the defendant's conduct is
long and tortuous."). See also, W. Page Keeton, et al, eds, Prosser and Keeton on the Law
of Torts ch 7 (West, 5th ed, 1984). "The conception of causation in fact extends not only to
positive acts and active physical forces, but also to pre-existing passive conditions which
have played a material part in bringing about the event." Id at 265.
62 Epstein calls the business necessity defense "a close cousin to the 'private necessity'
defense at common law" (p 213). He reminds us that this defense was "designed to avoid
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historical practices that remain as a present barrier, or by refer-
ence to common law principles, Griggs' analysis of the statute's
language is sound.
Epstein's argument that Griggs misconceived Congress's in-
tent as shown by the legislative history (pp 186-92) also is flawed.
Title VII was many things both to its supporters and its oppo-
nents. Whether or not articulated, it is likely that persons in both
camps envisioned the Griggs result. Some would applaud, others
would not. Those whose intent is deemed relevant s may or may
not have included in the record all that they wished the words to
bear; they may have included only so much as they felt they could
properly express under the circumstances. And whatever intent is
gleaned from original enactment may not include the intent of
some legislators to allow room for subsequent application to un-
foreseeable issues. These observations suggest that arguments
based on original intent are, at best, always difficult to sustain.6 '
Such difficulty is heightened when a later Congress acquiesces
in a court's statutory construction. Of course, this is precisely what
Congress did regarding Griggs when it enacted the 1972 amend-
ments to the Act, as Epstein recognizes.6 5 When a subsequent Con-
gress, especially one sharing many members of the enacting Con-
gress, .endorses the statutory construction given by a court, they
give legitimacy to a court's statutory reading. After all, subsequent
legislators are free to make up their own minds about what their
predecessors meant (or should have meant) and even the same leg-
islators may have changed their minds or rethought their original
position after the court's interpretation.
This rethinking is quite legitimate in the framework of the
suppositions that accompany successive popular elections in a rep-
resentative government. There is no reason why the "intent" of an
earlier Congress ought to control the views of later representatives
whose warrant for decision is as legitimate in a democratic polity,
as that of their predecessors. For, in the last analysis, if a court has
imminent peril of bankruptcy or death." Id. Those reasons seem good enough for our coun-
try as well.
" Epstein refers often to a memo prepared by Senators Case and Clark and to state-
ments by Senator Humphrey, (pp 162, 187-88, 190, 199, 200), in arguing that the statements
and comments of these proponents of Title VII don't support the Griggs decision. See 110
Cong Rec 6547, 7212-15, 7420 (1964). The Court in Griggs considered the arguments based
on these expressions and rejected them. 401 US at 434 n 11.
" See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest For Original Understanding, 60 B U L Rev
204, 219 (1980).
65 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 USC § 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
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so far strayed from any acceptable notion of statutory intent as to
be totally unpersuasive, or if the subsequent political consensus
causes rejection of what a court has done, Congress remains free to
overturn the court's understanding.66 That the 1971-72 Congress
adopted rather than overturned Griggs's effect test and the 1990-
91 Congress re-legislated it after Wards Cove,6 7 is assurance of the
correctness of Griggs's response to the meaning of our history and
its current demands.
3. Sex and other grounds.
Conventional wisdom has it that "sex" was added as one of
Title VII's "forbidden grounds" of discrimination as "a deliberate
ploy by foes of the bill to scuttle it." 6 Epstein (as have I) repeats
this charge.6 9 There is, however, some evidence that this was not
the case.70 Whatever the basis, its addition has dramatically
changed the American workplace.7 ' Of course, "the biology of sex
differences is profound," (p 271) and "wholly different social histo-
ries [ ] lie behind the two prohibitions [of race and sex]," (p 279)
but stating these obvious propositions does not make Title VII any
less curative.for society's longstanding exclusion of women from all
except "women's jobs" before the Act was passed. In this respect,
the Act's prophylaxis, by rooting out such widespread sex-based
exclusion, has obviously supplied the appropriate market
adjustment.
Epstein's analysis of the "costs" of such adjustment ranges
widely through such issues as the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion (BFOQ) exception in the statute7 2 (ch 14), allocations and dis-
tributions under pension plans (ch 15), the treatment of pregnancy
(ch 16), and, finally, sexual harassment (ch 17). Like his race anal-
" For recent examples, see The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub L No 100-
259, 102 Stat 28 (1988) which overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City Col-
lege v Bell, 465 US 555 (1984). And, of course, the example most directly related to the
book's subject is the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat 1071.
67 490 US 642 (1989).
"S Charles and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964
Civil Rights Act 234 (Seven Locks, 1985).
"9 "The statutory prohibition was added to Title VII ... as a ploy by the bill's oppo-
nents, who hoped to make the entire bill unpalatable to some of its wavering supporters" (p
278).
." See Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker
of Public Policy, IX Law and Ineq J 163 (1991).
71 Clarence Page, What Backlashers Won't Say About Affirmative Action, Chi Trib,
Perspective at 17 (Mar 3, 1993).
" 42 USC § at 20003(e)-2(h) (1988).
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ysis, he weighs the cost to employers in taking the statute's restric-
tions on otherwise market-based decisions into account, with the
"supposed benefit"-"root(ing) out sex differences in employment"
as "the greatest cost of all" to "men and women alike" (p 289).
Beyond his tendentiousness for the free market and against Title
VII, the core of his argument is against the Griggs business neces-
sity test as it has been applied to narrow the BFOQ defense (pp
283-84).
But any "sensible application" (p 289) of the BFOQ standard
that would allow it a broader scope would likely mirror the stan-
dards that were in place before the Act was passed. Since women
weren't in the marketplace to a significant extent at that time, and
the few exceptions experienced occupational restrictions, the mar-
ketplace had already generated notions of what work was appropri-
ate for them. Employers had no incentives to rethink or reevaluate
the standards. The reevaluation brought about by the statute, with
the safety-valve of the BFOQ defense for instances where sex truly
makes a difference, has had a salutary effect in opening all markets
to participation by more than fifty percent of those affected by
their operation. For example, women who are sole wage earners or
are in dual wage earner families, have not only increased earnings
but also influence-through their investing and spending deci-
sions-on all facets of markets where spending generates other ex-
changes as well as other jobs. Society as a whole reaps the benefits
of their greater participation. As to the pressures on employers
generated by the narrowing of the BFOQ defense, the assumptions
underlying common law adjudication, systems of adjudication gen-
erally, and the winnowing of claims usually associated with the
case or controversy requirement, would seem to be sufficient to re-
sist improper applications. In the meantime, the statute functions
to reshape conduct that has hurt people.
As to Epstein's arguments at the end of his book questioning
the addition of age and disability to the antidiscrimination norms
(chs 21, 22), I register no surprise at this hobglobin of consistency.
In his view, both additions cost more than they are worth. But the
question of worth can receive no consistent answer throughout all
possible applications. Since that is so, it would seem that real con-
cern for individual autonomy, for reciprocal liberty, might suggest
the need to place some limitation on purely arbitrary, cost-driven
decisions. Blanket age restrictions and inflexible rules regarding
the disabled are such decisions. Perhaps not from the employer's
standpoint, but from that of a society committed to achieving
some rough approximation of the notion of the "general welfare,"
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the age and disability discrimination bans seek to close the gap
between closed markets of the past and the more open markets of
tomorrow.
III. CONCLUSION: THE PREROGATIVE OF PHILOSOPHERS
Then does segregation offend against equality? Equality, like
all general concepts, has marginal areas where philosophic
difficulties are encountered. But if a whole race of people
finds itself confined within a system which is set up and con-
tinued for the very purpose of keeping it in an inferior sta-
tion, and if the question is then solemnly propounded
whether such a race is being treated "equally," I think we
ought to exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of philoso-
phers-that of laughter.73
One afternoon during the more optimistic days of the 1960s, I
was having a drink at the bar of the old Commodore Hotel in New
York City with my friend, Charles L. Black, Jr., who wrote the
lines quoted above, during a break from a conference we were at-
tending. Charles and I have known each other since the summer of
1961. He worked that summer at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
where I had worked since the previous December. He was then on
the Yale Law School Faculty. He had previously assisted Thurgood
Marshall (who had hired me) and the other lawyers in the briefs
and arguments in the Brown cases. 4 He wrote the article from
which the above quote is taken in response to an article by Profes-
sor Herbert Wechsler that criticized the original Brown decision
because of its interference with freedom of association.75
As we stood at the bar, Charles, a white native Texan who
grew up in the era of intense forced segregation in the South, said
that he thought that one of the reasons for white resistance to
Brown and the civil rights movement that it helped produce was
that there was perhaps too much talk about brotherhood; that per-
haps there should be more focus on the simple idea of citizenship,
an idea adopted by Congress a century earlier and written into the
Constitution. People, he thought, might more readily understand
73 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L J 421,
424 (1960).
74 Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954) ("Brown I); Brown v Board of
Education, 349 US 294 (1955) ("Brown II'.
75 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv L Rev
1 (1959).
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that concept and respond more favorably to it. At the time we
were talking, Title VII had been in effect for only a few years.
One purpose of Title VII was to help make citizenship for
blacks a reality. It seems clear now that the realization of that goal
remains a distant reality-more real perhaps, than it would have
been without Title VII, but distant nevertheless. Among the rea-
sons is what occurred during the Reagan-Bush years. The require-
ments of Title VII, as made applicable through court decisions,
were a particular target of the Reagan administration as I have
written elsewhere.76 Like Richard Epstein's "frontal intellectual as-
sault" from the seat of academe, the administration's assault was a
sustained assault from the seat of national governmental power, an
assault that spread throughout the nation. Like Epstein's assault,
it too preferred one of the two images with which I began. Both
assaults, one more sophisticated, the other less so, arrive at the
same watershed; they both cast doubt on Charles Black's hope that
the idea of citizenship might command the field in the recognition
of rights.
To read Epstein's book is to come away with the conviction
that the real concern-despite all the talk about market theory
and its imperatives-is less, a concern for how well the market
might work without civil rights laws, but more fundamentally, a
concern that the market not change in ways that lessen the domi-
nance of its most longstanding beneficiaries-white men. There is
the commonplace assault on the usual targets 'in the antidis-
crimination context which echoed throughout the Reagan-Bush
years: "color-blind treatment [ ] displaced by an explicit demand
for equality of results and, if necessary, for race-conscious affirma-
tive action programs" (p 266). Nothing new here really. His criti-
cism of "the political pressures and the partisan politics of race
legislation" (id) has the all too familiar ring of the seductive, but
ultimately discordant and woeful, siren song of Reaganomics as
well as the even more screeching cacophonies of the Radical Right.
His observation that "the root difficulty of the statute is that it
maintains that a qualified norm of forced association is better than
a strong norm of freedom of association" (p 505) echoes Wechsler's
quarrel with the Brown case to which Charles Black replied.
But this nation began with destructive compromises over
forced association of a very different sort whose effects remain with
us. All contemporary evidence reinforces the conclusion that these
71 See Norman C. Amaker, Civil Rights and the Reagan Administration ch 6 (Urban.
Institute, 1988).
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effects will continue for a very long time into the future; indeed
they may well be permanent as my good friend and colleague, Der-
rick Bell, has so persuasively argued. 7 Therefore, if one suggests as
Epstein does, that it is now "quittin' time" for Title VII, the only
possible reaction is to indulge the prerogative of philosophers.
7 Derrick Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism 198-99
(Bosie, 1992).
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